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Abstract
We analyze a model where firms chose a production technology which, together with
some random event, determines the final emission level. We consider the coexistence
of two alternative technologies: a “clean” technology, and a “dirty” technology. The
environmental regulation is based on taxes over reported emissions, and on penalties over
unreported emissions. We show that the optimal inspection policy is a cut-oﬀ strategy,
for several scenarios concerning the observability of the adoption of the clean technology
and the cost of adopting it. We also show that the optimal inspection policy induces the
firm to adopt the clean technology if the adoption cost is not too high, but the cost levels
for which the firm adopts it depend on the scenario.
JEL Classification numbers: K32, K42, D82.
Keywords: Production technology, random emissions, environmental taxes, optimal
monitoring policy.
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1 Introduction
Environmental Agencies (EAs) face the important challenge of encouraging and com-
pelling compliance with environmental laws and regulations. For this aim, they often
design a deterrence policy based on inspections. This paper contributes to the literature
that analyzes the optimal inspection policy taking into account firms’ strategic behavior.1
We build and analyze a model where firms choose a production technology which, to-
gether with some random event, determines the final emission level. That is, we explicitly
take into account the random nature of pollution and its eﬀects on the optimal inspection
policy.
Although firms can limit emissions of pollutants by deciding the production technology,
by adjusting the mix of outputs and inputs, and through the use of abating technologies,
this control is often not precise. Many factors such as weather, equipment failures, and
human error may cause realized emissions to diﬀer from intended emissions.
We consider the coexistence of two alternative technologies: a “clean” technology, in
the sense that its expected level of emissions is low, and a “dirty” technology, whose
expected level of emissions is high. For both technologies, the realized emission level is
random and it is privately observed by the firm. The environmental regulation is based
on taxes over reported emissions, monitoring, and penalties over unreported emissions.
The firm reports an emission level and pays the taxes associated to it. The true emission
level can only be observed (and made verifiable) by the EA after an inspection.
The EA is interested in the expected emission level. Hence its two concerns are whether
the firm adopts the clean technology or not, and to achieve its goal at the lowest cost. We
analyze the optimal monitoring of one firm when the EA takes into account the random
nature of pollution: bad luck may cause a high level of emissions even when the firm
adopts the clean technology while good luck may diminish emissions level of a firm that
uses the dirty technology. We distinguish three cases.
First, we assume that the EA knows the firm’s cost of adopting the technologies but
the technology chosen is not verifiable. We show that the inspection policy on the emission
level that induces the firm to adopt the clean technology at the lowest cost is a cut-oﬀ
1Cohen (1999) and Sandmo (2000) provide two recent and extensive reviews of the literature.
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strategy where all the reports under the cut-oﬀ are inspected with the same probability
and reports over this cut-oﬀ are not audited. Second, we analyze situations in which both
the technology adopted by the firm and its cost are non-verifiable. In this case, the EA is
forced to use the same monitoring policy for all types of firm. We show that firms with
low adoption costs will be induced to switch to the clean technology while high-cost firms
will keep the dirty one. The optimal policy is then also a cut-oﬀ policy consisting on the
one that would be designed for the “marginal” firm as if its emissions distribution was an
average between the clean and the dirty technology. Third, we consider the case where
the technology adopted by the firm is observable, but the cost encountered by the firm
is not. In this situation, the firm will be inspected (through a cut-oﬀ rule) only if it is
producing with the dirty technology.
In the three cases, the optimal inspection policy induces the firm to adopt the clean
technology if the adoption cost is not too high. We compare the conditions under which
the firm adopts the clean technology with the benchmark case where the EA has all
the information about the firm (first-best). When the technology adopted is private
information for the firm, the optimal monitoring policy induces the firm to choose the
clean technology for a smaller set of parameters than the first best. In contrast, when
the cost is private information for the firm while the technology adopted is verifiable, the
firm may produce with the clean technology for a larger set of parameters than in the
first best.
Several papers have considered that pollution emissions frequently produce stochastic
environmental damages.2 But they have studied diﬀerent aspects from our paper. Some
authors have analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of introducing self-reporting
(whereas in our paper is assumed to be in place) on the emission level in situations
where emissions are random. In particular, Innes (1999) analyzes a model where there
are expost benefits of cleaning-up if an environmental accident (high level of pollution)
occurs. In his model, firms choose the level of care (that can be interpreted as the choice
2For example, the damage from a given amount of eﬄuent released in a river depends on features
which vary temporally, such as seasonal fluctuations in water volume, temperature and turbidity. The
eﬀect of airborne emissions on air quality depends on prevailing atmospheric conditions, such as thermal
structure, circulation, pressure, and humidity.
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of a technology), and this care aﬀects the probability of an accident. Innes shows that
when there is no self-reporting a firm will engage in clean-up only if audited, while the
firm always cleans-up when self-reporting is in place. Malik (1993) compares the case with
and without self-reporting in a situation where collecting penalties and taxes is costly and
the monitoring technology is imperfect (including both types I and II of errors). In this
framework, self-reporting does not necessarily reduce regulation costs because of costly
sanction.3 Hamilton and Requate (2006) analyze the choice between emission caps and
environmental quality standards when emissions are random. They show that when firms
invest in abatement equipment, an emission standard induces over-investment relative to
the socially optimal resource allocation, while under-investment tends to occur under an
ambient environmental policy.
The model analyzed in this paper also contrasts with most of the models that study
the optimal inspection policy, since they assume that the firm decides directly its (non-
random) emission level (see, for example, Harford, 1978 and 1987, Sandmo, 2000, and
Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 2006). In Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2006),
we show that the EA optimal strategy induces a corner solution, in the sense that there
are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do
comply but all of them evade the environmental taxes. Concerning the optimality of the
use of environmental taxes, Macho-Stadler (2006) shows that it is less costly to achieve
any level of compliance through taxes than using standards or tradable permits.
Finally, some previous papers have analyzed how the regulatory regime via emissions
taxes or standards may aﬀect firms’ adoption of emissions abatement technology (see,
for example, Downing and White, 1986, Milliman, 1989, and Tarui and Polasky, 2005).
Our paper is complementary to these contributions as we show how to design a monitor-
ing policy, in environments where emissions cannot be identified without inspection, to
maximize firms’ adoption at the lowest cost.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model and analyze
a firm’s report given its technology and the inspection policy. Section 3 deals with the
optimal policy that induces a single firm to switch to the clean technology, under three
diﬀerent scenarios concerning the observability of the change in technology and the cost
3See also Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Livernois and McKenna (1999).
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of switching technologies. In Section 4, we conclude and discuss the optimal inspection
policy when the EA faces a family of firms. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Firm’s report under emission taxes
We model situations where firm’s emissions are random, but they are influenced by the
firms’ choice of technology. A firm’s level of emissions (or damages) e is distributed
in the interval [e, e] according to the distribution function F (e;E), where E denotes
the production technology chosen by the firm. We assume that F (·;E) is continuously
diﬀerentiable and that f(e;E) = ∂F (e;E)/∂e > 0 on [e, e]. The cost of the technology E
is sunk.
We assume that emissions are taxed according to a linear schedule, with marginal tax
rate t. Therefore, the emissions costs of a firm that produces a level of emissions e, and
pays the taxes corresponding to e (i.e., there is perfect monitoring of emissions) are te.
Therefore, the ex-ante expected costs of the firm given the technology E are:
C(E) = t
Z e
e
edF (e;E).
We will consider situations where both technology and emissions levels are firm’s
private information. However, emissions can be assessed if the firm is monitored by the
EA. The firm is asked to send a report z ∈ [e, e] on its emissions level, once the emissions
are realized. The firmmay choose a report z that does not coincide with the true emissions
level e.
The EA has two instruments to dissuade the firm from cheating about their emissions:
monitoring and penalties. We denote by α(z) the probability that the EA will audit the
emissions of the firm when it reports a level of emissions z. The strategy α(·) followed by
the EA is decided previous to the choice of the technology E, that is, we assume that the
EA is able to commit to its monitoring strategy. If the firm is monitored and its level of
emissions is found to be higher than its report, then a penalty is imposed to the firm. For
simplicity, we assume that the penalty is linear in the underreported emissions. We also
assume that the marginal penalty rate, denoted θ, is exogenous. Parameter θ includes
the taxes due to the EA, hence θ > t.
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The firm’s expected costs when the emissions are e, the report is z and the monitoring
strategy is α(·) are:
c(e, z;α(·)) = tz + α(z)θ[e− z].
The timing of the decisions is as follows. First, the EA decides on the monitoring
strategy α(·). Second, the firm chooses the technology E at a certain cost. Emissions
are realized according to the density function f(e;E). Third, after having observed the
realized emissions e, the firm decides on the report z and pays the taxes tz. The firm is
monitored with probability α(z). If it is audited and it has underreported, then the firm
pays the penalty θ[e− z].
The firm chooses z to minimize its costs c(e, z;α(·)), as a function of the realized
emissions e. That is, at the last stage, the firm chooses z(e). We denote c(e;α(·)) =
c(e, z(e);α(·)) firm’s expected costs when its emissions level is e and it makes the report
that minimizes its costs.
We start with two results that provide useful information concerning firm’s behavior
with respect to the report.
Lemma 1 (i) A Firm never reports more than their emissions.
(ii) If α(z) > t/θ, then a firm never reports z when e > z.
(iii) When its emissions level is e, then a firm reports honestly only if α(z) ≥ t/θ for
all z ∈ [e, e).
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is the following. Given the tax rate t and the penalty
rate θ, a monitoring probability of t/θ is enough to spur honest behavior. Therefore, a firm
never submits a report z lower than its real emission e if reporting z leads to inspection
with a probability higher than t/θ. On the other hand, the firm will not report honestly
if it can submit a report z < e that is monitored with a probability lower than t/θ.
According to Lemma 1, the EA will not have incentives to inspect any report with a
probability higher than t/θ, since monitoring is costly. Therefore, t/θ is an upper bound
for the optimal monitoring probability.
Proposition 1 Given the monitoring policy α(·), if the report z(e) minimizes firm’s costs
when the emissions level is e, then:
α(z(e)) is nonincreasing in e, and (1)
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c(e;α(·)) = c(e;α(·)) + θ
Z e
e
α(z(x))dx. (2)
Moreover, if (1) and (2) hold, then z(e) minimizes firm’s expected costs over the set of
all possible equilibrium reports, i.e., {z|z = z(eo) for some eo ∈ [e, e]} when the emissions
level is e.
For any given report, the penalty that the firm pays if it is caught underreporting
increases with its realized pollution level. Therefore, the higher the emission level, the
more incentives the firm has to chose reports with low monitoring probability. This
explains that α(z(e)) is nonincreasing in e. As to the expected costs, equation (2) states
that the cost borne by the firm when its emissions are e is the integral of the monitoring
probability of every level below e. This equation is also explained by the firm’s possibility
of underreporting. By inspecting with probability α(z(x)), the EA makes the firm pay
an expected penalty of θα(z(x)) when its emission level is x. But this similarly aﬀects
the firm’s expected costs when it underreports for any emission higher than x, since z(x)
is always a possible report. Hence, equation (2) provides the expected cost borne by the
firm when its emission level is e.
Note that, although the tax rate t does not explicitly appear in equation (2), it plays
a role as it sets the upper bound for the probability α(.). The rate t is only important for
those emission levels for which the firm reports honestly. For example, if the report z(e)
is such that α(z(e)) = t/θ for all e ≤ eˆ and α(z(e)) < t/θ otherwise, then we can write
c(e;α(·)) = c(e;α(·)) + t [eˆ− e] + θ
Z e
eˆ
α(z(x))dx.
We can use Proposition 1 to compute firm’s expected costs of using the technology E:
Proposition 2 Given the monitoring policy α(·), if the report strategy z(·) minimizes
firm’s costs for all emissions levels, then:
C(E;α(·)) = c(e;α(·)) + θ
Z e
e
α(z(e)) [1− F (e;E)] de. (3)
In this section, we have analyzed the firm’s strategic behavior concerning its report,
once it knows the pollution level. We have computed the firm’s expected cost due to the
environmental policy of taxes, inspection, and penalties. We have developed the analysis
for an exogenous monitoring policy. In the next section, we characterize the optimal
monitoring policy from the EA’s point of view.
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3 Optimal monitoring
We analyze a situation where two production technologies are possible: ED and EC.
Technology EC is a cleaner but also more expensive technology than ED (subscript C
stands for “clean” and D for “dirty”). We assume that the firm is initially producing
according to ED and we denote by ∆ the cost of switching from the dirty technology to
the clean one.4 On the other hand, the clean technology has lower average emissions, i.e.,R e
e edF (e;E
C) <
R e
e edF (e;E
D).5
In this paper, we assume that the environmental policy is based on taxes over reported
emissions, monitoring, and penalties. For example, we do not consider the possibility
that the Government or the EA might give the firm a subsidy if it switches to a clean
technology, or that it imposes a fixed penalty to firms keeping the dirty technology. When
the technology adopted by the firm is not verifiable (i.e., only the firm knows the expected
level of pollution of the technologies), the previous policies based on fixed subsidies or
penalties cannot be implemented, as they require the EA to be able to check whether a
change to a clean technology has taken place. Similarly, these policies are not possible in
those environments where “clean” or “dirty” refer to the care that firms take with respect
to the maintenance of the existing technology or to avoiding mistakes. In this sense,
we interpret that a firm uses a clean technology when it devotes (monetary and human)
resources to the good functioning of its equipment, while a firm produces according to a
dirty technology when it does not care much about the correct running of the equipment,
thus leading to higher expected level of emissions. On the other hand, when the EA can
easily check whether a firm has adopted a more environmentally friendly technology (or
whether it is using the technology trying to minimize pollution), a fixed reward or penalty
4We can also consider situations where the firm is not using any of the two technologies and it has to
chose one of them. In this case, ∆ is interpreted as the diﬀerence in costs of the technologies, i.e., the
cost to adopt the former instead of the later.
5In our framework, the emissions from both technologies are equally diﬃcult to inspect. Some authors
have analyzed technologies that can aﬀect the observability of firms’ emissions. Heyes (1993) considers
a model where firms may invest in decreasing “inspectability”. Millock et al. (2002) studies a choice of
technology that aﬀects the verifiability of emission: adopting the technology allows nonpoint sources to
become point sources.
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can be optimal. Therefore, our analysis applies to those situations where, due to political,
technical, or moral hazard constraints, a policy based on fixed subsidies or penalties is
not possible.
Given the policy announced by the Government and the EA involving taxes over
reported emissions, monitoring, and penalties over unreported emissions, the firm will
choose the clean technology if and only if its total expected costs are lower than using
the dirty technology, that is, if C(EC ;α(·)) +∆ ≤ C(ED;α(·)). This inequality can be
written as the following incentive constraint:
∆ ≤ θ
Z e
e
α(z(e))
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de. (4)
The monitoring policy decided by the EA strongly influences the choice between EC
and ED. We normalize the cost of an inspection to 1, and we look for the optimal
monitoring policy, that is, the policy that minimizes EA’s monitoring costs.
It might be the case that the firm chooses technology ED for any possible monitoring
strategy. Indeed, if the diﬀerence in cost ∆ is very large, the firm may prefer paying all
the expected taxes corresponding to the emissions induced by ED rather than adopting
the clean technology. In what follows, we will assume that the set of functions α(·) that
lead the firm to choose EC is not empty, which is equivalent to state that the toughest
policy (α(z) = t/θ for all z) leads the firm to use the clean technology.
Assumption 1: ∆ < t
R e
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de.
Although part of the analysis of the optimal policy is developed without assumptions
concerning the distribution functions F (e;EC) and F (e;ED), the complete characteriza-
tion of the policies will require further assumptions. In particular, we will assume that
the density functions f(e;EC) and f(e;ED) are linear. Also, to help notation, we will
normalize [e, e] = [0, 1] .
Assumption 2: f(e;EC) = a + 2 [1− a] e, f(e;ED) = b + 2 [1− b] e, for all e ∈ [0, 1] ,
where a, b ∈ (0, 2) , and a > b.
Note that the property F (1;EC) = F (1;ED) = 1 characterizes the slope of the linear
functions f(1;EC) and f(1;ED), once we choose the independent terms a and b. Moreover,
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the idea that EC is a cleaner technology than ED is reflected in the inequality a > b. Also
note that although Assumption 2 is restrictive, it allows the flexibility of dealing with
distribution functions F (e;EC) and F (e;ED) that may be linear (a = 1 or b = 1) concave
(a > 1 or b > 1), or convex (a < 1 or b < 1). On the other hand, it is a strong assumption
that is helpful to identify a simple monitoring policy. We will comment later on the
properties of the optimal monitoring policy in more general setups.
In the next subsection, we assume that both the firm and the EA know the cost
∆ and we will characterize the policy that the EA puts in place if it wants to induce
the firm to adopt technology EC. That is, we look for the cheapest policy, in terms of
monitoring costs, to achieve EC for a given ∆. In subsection 3.2, we relax the assumption
that the EA knows ∆ and look for the optimal monitoring policy when ∆ is firm’s private
information. Finally, in subsection 3.3 we will analyze the scenario where the firm has
private information concerning ∆ but the EA can check whether the firm has adopted the
clean technology.
3.1 Optimal monitoring to achieve a clean technology when the
cost ∆ is public information
We assume that the EA is concerned about inducing the firm to adopt the clean tech-
nology. In this section, we consider a situation where the EA observes the cost ∆, but
is uninformed about the technology that the firm adopts and about the realized emission
level. The EA receives the report z form the firm. The optimization problem of the
EA, that minimizes monitoring costs, when it wants the firm to adopt technology EC is
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program [P ] below:
Min
(α(z))z∈[e,e]
Z e
e
α (z(e)) dF (e;EC)
s.t.: α(z(e)) is nonincreasing in e
α(z(e)) ∈ [0, t/θ] for all e ∈ [e, e]Z e
e
α(z(e))dF (e;EC) ≤ B
z(e) minimizes c(e, z;EC ;α(·)) for all e ∈ [e, e]
∆ ≤ θ
Z e
e
α(z(e))
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de.
We can simplify program [P ] as follows. We do not take into account the constraint
that z(e) minimizes c(e, z;EC ;α(·)), and we denote the function α(z(e)) as β(e). Once
we identify β(e), we will use Proposition 1 to decompose the function β(e) into the
optimal monitoring function α(z) and the report function z(e). The optimal β(·) solves
the following program, that we will denote [P 0]:
Min
(β(e))e∈[e,e]
Z e
e
β(e)dF (e;EC)
s.t.: β(e) is nonincreasing in e
β(e) ∈ [0, t/θ] for all e ∈ [e, e]Z e
e
β(e)dF (e;EC) ≤ B
∆ ≤ θ
Z e
e
β(e)
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de.
Next Proposition states an important general property of the solution to program [P 0]:
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1 and for any distribution function F (.), there exists
a solution β(·) to [P 0] that takes on at most one value diﬀerent from 0 and t/θ.
Given Proposition 3 and β(e) nonincreasing in e, there exist d ∈ (0, t/θ), e1 and e2,
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with e ≤ e1 ≤ e2 ≤ e, such that the optimal function β(e) has the following shape:
β(e) = t/θ for all e ∈ [e, e1] ,
β(e) = γ for all e ∈ (e1, e2) ,
β(e) = 0 for all e ∈ [e2, e] .
Proposition 3 shows that the optimal monitoring policy is very simple independently on
the shape of the distribution functions. Proposition 4 goes a step forward and shows that,
under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal policy is quite simple. To state this Proposition,
let us define the function h(e) as follows:
h(e) ≡ f(e;EC)− F (e;E
C)− F (e;ED)R e
e [F (x;E
C)− F (x;ED)] dxF (e;E
C).
The function h(e) plays an important role in the proof of Proposition 4, and allow us to
define a cut-oﬀ level. It is easy to check that, under Assumption 2, h(e) is first negative
and then positive. We denote by e∗ the cut-oﬀ level such that h(e) < 0 if e < e∗ and
h(e) > 0 if e > e∗, that is, e∗ is defined by h(e∗) = 0.6 Easy computations show that e∗
is an increasing function of a.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(a) If ∆ < t
R e∗
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de, then a solution β(e) to [P 0] is
β(e) = bγ for all e ∈ [e, e∗) ,
β(e) = 0 for all e ∈ [e∗, e] ,
where bγ < t/θ is defined by:
bγθ Z e∗
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de = ∆. (5)
(b) If ∆ ≥ t
R e∗
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de, then a solution β(e) to [P 0] is
β(e) = t/θ for all e ∈ [e, be) ,
β(e) = 0 for all e ∈ [be, e] ,
6 Under Assumption 2, e∗ = 3/4 when a = 1, e∗ = −2a+
√
4a2+6a(1−a)
2(1−a) ∈ (0, 1) when a 6= 1.
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where be ≥ e∗ is defined by:
t
Z e
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de = ∆.
The optimal monitoring policy is very simple. We here highlight its main character-
istics. First, the EA will always monitor, at least, the reports corresponding to all the
emission levels lower than the cut-oﬀ value e∗. Note that the cut-oﬀ e∗ is usually high;
for the intermediate case a = 1, e∗ = 3/4. Second, the probability of monitoring is the
same for all the reports subject to audit. Third, as long as the incentive problem is not
very acute, in the sense that adopting the clean technology is not very costly, the EA will
only monitor when the realized emission level is lower than e∗. Finally, when the incen-
tive problem is very severe, the monitoring probability is the highest possible, among the
sensible ones, (i.e., β = t/θ) for all the reports subject to audit.
Once we know the optimal function β(e), we can use Proposition 1 to state the optimal
monitoring policy as a function of the report, α(z), as well as firms’ reporting behavior
given the optimal monitoring policy, z(e). Proposition 5 characterizes these functions.
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(a) If ∆ < t
R e∗
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de, then the following policy α∗(z) is optimal:
α∗(z) = bγ for all z ∈ [e, z∗) ,
α∗(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [z∗, e] , where
z∗ = e+
∆
t
(e∗ − e)R e∗
e [F (e;E
C)− F (e;ED)] de
.
Facing the monitoring policy α∗(z), the firm’s reporting strategy is the following:
z(e) = e for all e ∈ [e, e∗) ,
z(e) = z∗ for all e ∈ [e∗, e] .
(b) If ∆ ≥ t
R e∗
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de, then the following policy α∗(z) is optimal:
α∗(z) = t/θ for all z ∈ [e, be) ,
α∗(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [be, e] .
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Facing the monitoring policy α∗(z), the firm’s reporting strategy is the following:
z(e) = e for all e ∈ [e, be) ,
z(e) = be for all e ∈ [be, e] .
We now explain the intuitions behind Propositions 4 and 5. The EA’s objective is to
dissuade the firm from using the dirty technology at the least possible (monitoring) cost.
To “convince” the firm, the EA must choose a monitoring strategy that makes the firm
bear high expected environmental costs (also taking into account the penalties) if it uses
the dirty technology, and low expected costs if it produces according to the clean one.
A dirty technology has a higher probability to produce high emission levels than a clean
technology. For the case of linear density functions over the interval [0, 1] (Assumption 2),
the clean technology has higher density for e ∈ [0, 1/2) and lower density for e ∈ (1/2, 1].
Therefore, in terms of dissuasion, the EA would find it beneficial to make the firm pay
as much as possible (and that can be achieved by monitoring with high probability)
when realized emissions are high and as little as possible when realized emissions are low.
However, the EA does not observe the realized emission level, only the firm does. The
EA only receives the firm’s report.
When emissions are not public information, equation (2) in Proposition 1 states that
the cost borne by the firm when the emission level is eo is the integral of the monitoring
probability of every level below eo. That is, increasing the probability of monitoring the
report corresponding to a level e aﬀects in the same way the cost suﬀered for every emission
level higher than e. Hence, monitoring the report corresponding to a high emission level,
say e0 > 1/2, has good incentive consequences concerning the decision to use a clean
technology, as it aﬀects the cost borne for every realized emission e ≥ e0. On the other
hand, monitoring the report corresponding to a low emission level, say e00 < 1/2, has mixed
incentive consequences since it aﬀects the cost associated to both high (every e > 1/2)
and low (every e ∈ [e0, 1/2)) emission levels.
The diﬃculty is that, from equation (1) in Proposition 1, the EA is constraint to use
a monitoring probability nonincreasing in the emission level. That is, if the EA wants to
monitor the (firm’s optimal) report corresponding to a certain level of emissions eo, then
it is forced to monitor the reports corresponding to all the levels e < eo with, at least, the
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same frequency.
To understand how the EA solves the previous diﬃculty, consider also that ∆ is
small in such a way that inducing the firm to switch to the clean technology is easy
(Region (a) in Proposition 4). Could it make sense for the EA to monitor only the reports
corresponding to low emission levels? The answer is no. The EA does better monitoring
reports chosen by a larger range of emission levels (including levels higher than 1/2) with
lower probability. The cost paid by the higher emission levels will be the same, while the
cost borne by the lower emission levels will be lower, which gives the firm more incentives
to adopt the clean technology (more precisely, it will allow the EA to save on monitoring
costs). Is it optimal for the EA to set a full flat policy (i.e., e∗ = e)? The answer to this
question is also negative because monitoring the report corresponding to emission levels
very close to e only aﬀects the payment of a very small interval of emissions.
In the case where the density function f(e;EC) is uniform, i.e., a = 1, the trade-
oﬀ leads to a flat policy consisting in auditing the reports corresponding to every e <
3/4 = e∗ with the same (small) probability. When f(e;EC) is not uniform, the argument
is more complex, as switching monitoring probabilities from one level to the other has
consequences in terms of monitoring costs. This is why when the distribution function
f(e;EC) is decreasing, it is optimal to state an even flatter technology (e∗ > 3/4), while
the opposite happens when f(e;EC) is increasing.7
The previous discussion also allows to comment on the generality of the results with
7It is worth comparing our context with situations in which the objective of the agency is to raise
the largest amount of taxes, for a given technology. In such latest situations, the agency is much less
interested in focusing in high-emission levels. For example, in the tax evasion literature it is assumed
that the distribution of income is given and the objective of the enforcement agency is to maximize the
collected revenues (taxes plus penalties). In this case, the optimal policy consists in auditing all the
taxpayers reporting incomes lower than a certain cut-oﬀ income with a probability high enough so that
those reports will happen to be truthful, while the taxpayers earning higher incomes will report the cut-oﬀ
income and will not be subjet to audit. The main intuition for this result is the one we have provided in
the main text: putting pressure over the report corresponding to an emission level increases the revenue
collected from every higher level. That is, it is beneficial to concentrate the monitoring in the lowest levels
of income (with the maximum probability t/θ). Some papers in the tax evasion literature are Reinganum
and Wilde (1985), Scotchmer (1987), Sánchez and Sobel (1993), and Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo
(1997).
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respect to the shape of the distribution functions. First, according to our arguments,
monitoring every single emission with some probability (i.e., e2 = e) is not optimal for
general distribution functions. Second, the property that the monitoring policy is flat for
quite a wide range of emissions can be stated under quite reasonable hypotheses. For
example, assume that F (e;EC) > F (e;ED) for all e ∈ (e, e), F (e;EC)− F (e;ED) is first
increasing and then decreasing in e, and F (e;EC) is concave in e. Under these necessary
conditions, it is possible to prove that there exists a cut-oﬀ value e# that lies in the
region of emissions where F (e;EC) − F (e;ED) is decreasing such that β(e) is constant
for all e < e#. In particular, the reports corresponding to all emission levels e < e# are
monitored with a low probability when the cost of adopting the clean technology is low.
On the other hand, it seems more diﬃcult to propose general necessary conditions to
establish the precise form of the optimal monitoring strategy for higher emission levels.
Although we know that the highest levels are never monitored, it is diﬃcult to prove more
general results.
Next, Corollary 1 states the monitoring cost ECost(∆) of the implementation of the
clean technology as a function of the parameters of the model.
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(I) Expected monitoring costs ECost are the following:
(Ia) If ∆ < t
R e∗
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de, then:
ECost(∆) =
∆
θ
F (e∗;EC)R e∗
e [F (e;E
C)− F (e;ED)] de
.
(Ib) If ∆ ≥ t
R e∗
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de, then:
ECost(∆) =
t
θ
F (be;EC).
(II) Expected monitoring costs are increasing in the diﬀerence ∆ and they are decreasing
with the penalty rate θ; they are higher the less clean is technology EC and the less dirty
is technology ED. Finally, expected costs are increasing in the ratio t/θ in Region (b).
We now explain the comparative statics in Corollary 1. First, the higher the cost ∆
for the firm to switch the to clean technology, the higher the monitoring cost required to
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give it incentives to adopt EC . We can easily check that:
∂ECost
∂∆
=
f(e2;EC)
θ [F (e2;EC)− F (e2;ED)]
,
where e2 = e∗ in Region (a) and e2 = be in Region (b). Second, a higher penalty rate θ
makes it easier to “convince” the firm, hence it decreases the EA’s cost. Third, the larger
(in terms of expected pollution) the diﬀerence between the two technologies, the more the
EA’s monitoring can target the dirty technology, which also decreases monitoring costs.
Finally, an increase in the tax rate t forces the EA to increase the monitoring probability
if it wants the firm to be honest when the level of pollution is low (which is the optimal
policy in Region (b)). Therefore, the monitoring costs increase with t. That is, a though
policy in terms of penalty rate and (in Region (b)) a soft policy in terms of tax rate help
in keeping low monitoring costs.
3.2 Optimal policy when the cost ∆ is not observable by the EA
We now address the EA’s optimal policy when the cost∆ of adopting the clean technology
is the firm’s own private information. We model this situation as follows. The firm
knows ∆ while the EA only has statistical information about it. The EA believes that
the parameter ∆ is distributed according to the density function g(∆) over the interval£
0,∆
¤
; we denote by G(∆) the distribution function of ∆. The EA cares about expected
pollution, hence its concern is whether the firm chooses the clean or the dirty technology.
Given that the only instrument in hands of the EA is the monitoring probability, the
policy is anonymous, i.e., every type of firm is subject to the same monitoring policy.8
Inspection of the incentive compatibility constraint (4) makes it clear that incentives
to switch to the clean technology are strictly decreasing with the switching cost. That is,
for a given monitoring policy, if a firm with parameter ∆ adopts the clean technology, it
will also adopt it if its parameter is ∆0 < ∆. Therefore, any policy α(.) will induce the
8We can also see the analysis developed in this and next subsection as the study of the optimal
monitoring policy when the EA faces a family of firms characterized by the cost parameter ∆. The
EA has some beliefs about the distribution of the adoption cost in the family of firms, beliefs that are
reflected in the function G(∆). However, it does not know the adoption cost of any particular firm. Next
propositions and corollaries have an immediate interpretation in this context.
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firm to adopt EC if its parameter lies in an interval [0,∆n], for some ∆n ∈
£
0,∆
¤
.9
Next proposition characterizes the policy that minimizes monitoring costs when the
EA wants the firm to switch to EC if∆ lies in the interval [0,∆n]. The policy is qualitative
the same as the one stated in Proposition 5, although the cut-oﬀ levels are diﬀerent. The
precise value for the parameters en, zn, ben, and bγn that appear in Proposition 6 are given
in the Appendix. They do not correspond to the optimal cut-oﬀ levels whenever the EA
would like to give incentives to switch technology to a firm with parameter ∆n. That
is, the homogeneous monitoring policy does not coincide with the optimal policy for the
“marginal firm” ∆n. It would correspond to a firm with adoption costs of ∆n, whose
incentives are given by the diﬀerence between the distribution functions F (e;EC) and
F (e;ED), but whose actual emissions are given by the (average) distribution function
G(∆n)F (e;EC) + [1−G(∆n)]F (e;ED) instead of F (e;EC).
Proposition 6 Suppose the firm’s cost parameter ∆ is distributed according to G(∆), it
is firm’s private information, and assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If the EA wants the firm to
adopt EC if ∆ ∈ [0,∆n] and cannot observe the technology choice:
(a) If ∆n < t
R en
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de, then the following policy αn(z) is optimal:
αn(z) = bγn for all z ∈ [e, zn) ,
αn(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [zn, e] .
(b) If ∆n ≥ t
R en
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de, then the following policy αn(z) is optimal:
αn(z) = t/θ for all z ∈ [e, ben) ,
αn(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [ben, e] .
The policy αn(z) stated in Proposition 6 requires monitoring all reports below a cut-
oﬀ value (en or ben depending on the region) with the same probability, that is, a large
range of (low) reports are monitored with a uniform probability, while high reports are
never monitored. The intuitions behind the optimality of this policy are similar to the
one discussed after Propositions 4 and 5.
9The letter n in ∆n stands for (technology adoption) non verificable. In next subsection, the adoption
is supposed verifiable and we will use ∆v.
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The expected monitoring cost of the policy αn(z) depends on the interval [0,∆n] of
types of firms that the EA wants to adopt EC. The larger the interval, i.e., the higher
∆n, the higher the expected cost ECostn([0,∆n]) when the adoption of the technology is
not observable. Using the envelop theorem in program [PM ] in the proof of Proposition
6, we can deduce that:10
∂ECostn([0,∆n])
∂∆n
= γg(∆n)
£
F (e2;EC)− F (e2;ED)
¤
+
£
G(∆n)f(e2;EC) + [1−G(∆n)] f(e2;ED)
¤
[F (e2;EC)− F (e2;ED)] θ
, (6)
where e2 = en and γ = bγn in Region (a) and e2 = ben and γ = t/θ in Region (b). To
explain expression (6), note that an increase in the cut-oﬀ level ∆n has two eﬀects on
the monitoring costs. First, for a firm with a higher switching cost to adopt EC , the
monitoring probability must increase. This aﬀects the firm independently on its type and
is reflected in the second term in the right-hand side of (6). Second, there are types of
firms that were keeping ED before the increase in the cut-oﬀ and are adopting EC after
the change. A firm using EC is monitored more often (although its expected payment is
lower) than if it keeps ED (this is due to the property that the monitoring probability
should be non-decreasing in realized emission, see Proposition 1). Both eﬀects go in the
same direction: inducing more proportion of firms to adopt EC increases the monitoring
costs.
How is the optimal ∆n∗ decided? If the firm’s cost ∆ was public information (and
the firm’s technology verifiable), the Government (or the EA) would weight benefits of
adopting technology EC due to the reduction in pollution against costs of adoption,
∆. This balance would determine the optimal ∆∗ below which the firm should (from a
social point of view) adopt EC. When the firm has private information about ∆, then
the Government also takes into account the monitoring cost. One natural form for the
Government’s welfare function is:
B(G(∆n))− ECostn([0,∆n])− κ
Z ∆n
0
∆g(∆)d∆,
where B(G(∆n) is an increasing and concave function measuring the benefits due to the
10The optimal solution of program [PM ] always involves e1 = e.
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firms’ adoption of EC when the switching cost is lower than ∆n and κ is the weight the
Government gives to firms’ profits.
Given that ECostn([0,∆n]) is increasing in ∆n, it is immediate that the optimal
decision in this case will involve a level ∆n < ∆∗, that is, the expected level of pollution
will be higher than the first-best level of pollution:
Corollary 2 Suppose the cost parameter ∆ and the technology adopted are the firm’s
own private information. Then, the optimal monitoring policy induces the firm to adopt
technology EC for an interval of parameters [0,∆n∗] that is smaller than the first-best
interval [0,∆∗].
3.3 Optimal monitoring when the technology adopted by the
firm is verifiable but ∆ is not
In this subsection, we study the environments where the EA can easily verify the tech-
nology adopted by the firm. However, it does not know the adoption costs ∆.
Given that the EA is not concerned about the environmental taxes raised, the optimal
policy in this case involves not monitoring at all the firm if it decides to switch to EC.
Therefore, the firm can “buy” immunity from environmental taxes by adopting the clean
technology. For similar reasons as in the previous subsection, for any given monitoring
policy (that will only be applied to the firm if it keeps ED) the firm adopts EC if its
parameter ∆ lies in an interval [0,∆v]. What is the optimal monitoring policy for the
firm when it adopts ED? It needs to give incentives for the firm to switch to EC even
when its costs are ∆v and the distribution of emissions of those firms that are monitored
is F (e;ED). Therefore:
Proposition 7 Suppose the firm’s cost parameter ∆ is distributed according to G(∆), it
is firm’s private information, and assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If the EA wants the firm to
adopt EC if ∆ ∈ [0,∆v] and can observe the technology choice:
(i) If the firm adopts EC, it is not monitored.
(ii) If the firm adopts ED, is audited according to the policy found in Proposition 5
for a firm with adoption costs of ∆v.
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The monitoring policy will only be applied to the firm if it uses ED, which happens
when its parameter lies in the interval
¡
∆v,∆
¤
. Moreover, the policy applied is the one
that would be optimal if the EA would face a firm with “known” adoption cost of ∆v.
Therefore, the expected monitoring costs ECostv([0,∆v]) to achieve firm’s adoption of
EC for switching costs in [0,∆v] when the technology used by the firm is verifiable, are:
ECostv([0,∆v]) = [1−G(∆v)]
Z e∗
e
bγf(e;ED) = [1−G(∆v)] ∆vF (e∗;ED)
θ
R e∗
e [F (e;E
C)− F (e;ED)] de
,
when the parameters lie in Region (a) of Proposition 5, i.e.,∆ < t
R e∗
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de.
In Region (b):
ECostv([0,∆v]) = [1−G(∆v)] tF (be;ED)
θ
.
Consider Region (a) (the qualitative properties in Region (b) are similar). It is imme-
diate that:
∂ECostv([0,∆v])
∂∆v
= [[1−G(∆v)]− g(∆v)∆v] F (e
∗;ED)
θ
R e∗
e [F (e;E
C)− F (e;ED)] de
.
As it was the case in the previous section, an increase in ∆v has two eﬀects on the
monitoring costs. The monitoring probability must increase to “convince” the firm more
often to adopt EC . But, the probability that the firm is monitored is lower, as it switches
to EC more often. That is, there is an eﬀect (the positive term in the previous equation)
that makes the monitoring cost increase, while another eﬀect (the negative term) goes in
the sense of decreasing monitoring costs. In fact, there are environments where there is
too much adoption of clean technology compared with the first-best situation.11
Corollary 3 Suppose the cost parameter ∆ is the firm’s own private information and that
the adoption of the technology is verifiable. Then, the optimal monitoring policy induces
the firm to adopt technology EC for an interval of parameters [0,∆v∗] that may be larger
or shorter than the first-best interval [0,∆∗].
11For example, there is too much adoption if g(∆) is uniform and ∆∗ > ∆/2.
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4 Conclusion
We have considered a situation where the environmental policy is based on taxes over
reported emissions, monitoring, and penalties. We have assumed that emissions are firm’s
private information and that they depend on a firm’s decision (adopting the clean or the
dirty technology) and some random elements. The added value of our paper lies in the
analysis of the optimal monitoring policy when this random characteristic is present. We
have developed the analysis in diﬀerent scenarios depending on whether the technology
adopted by the firm is verifiable or not, and on whether the EA knows the cost of adopting
the clean technology. In all the cases, the optimal policy is a cut-oﬀ policy, where all
reports below the threshold are inspected with the same probability, while reports above
the threshold are not monitored. We have also shown that if the adoption of the technology
is firms’ private information, too few firms will adopt the clean technology under the
optimal monitoring policy. However, this is not necessarily true if the EA can check the
technology adopted.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, reporting more than the emissions is never optimal, since the
expected payment is always higher. Second, if e > z and α(z) > t/θ, then c(e, z;α(·)) =
tz + α(z)θ[e − z] > tz + t[e − z], which is the payment the firm would make if it would
report e. Therefore, reporting z is not optimal. Finally, by similar reasons, reporting e is
not optimal when α(z) < t/θ for some z ∈ [e, e).
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider two emissions levels e1 and e2 with e1 > e2 and
the optimal reports corresponding to these levels, z(e1) and z(e2). Given that the firm
prefers reporting z(e1) than z(e2) when the emissions level is e1, and viceversa, we have:
c(e1;α(·)) = tz(e1) + α(z(e1))θ[e1 − z(e1)] ≤ tz(e2) + α(z(e2))θ[e1 − z(e2)],
c(e2;α(·)) = tz(e2) + α(z(e2))θ[e2 − z(e2)] ≤ tz(e1) + α(z(e1))θ[e2 − z(e1)].
These equations imply:
α(z(e1))θ[e1 − e2] ≤ c(e1;α(·))− c(e2;α(·)) ≤ α(z(e2))θ[e1 − e2]. (7)
23
First, since e1 − e2 > 0, (7) requires that α(z(e1)) ≤ α(z(e2)), i.e., α(z(e)) is nonin-
creasing in e. Second, α(z(e)) nonincreasing and (7) imply that c(e;α(·)) is diﬀerentiable
in e almost everywhere, with
dc(e;α(·))
de
= α(z(e))θ almost everywhere.
Equation (2) immediately follows.
Finally, assume (1) and (2) hold. Then, a firm with emissions level e reporting z(eo)
has a expected cost of:
tz(eo) + α(z(eo))θ[e− z(eo)] = c(eo;α(·)) + α(z(eo))θ[e− eo] =
c(e;α(·))+θ
Z eo
e
α(z(x))dx+α(z(eo))θ[e−eo] = c(e;α(·))+θ
Z eo
e
[α(z(x))− α(z(eo))] dx.
Given (1),
R eo
e [α(z(x))− α(z(eo))] dx ≥ 0.
Therefore, z(e) is optimal in {z|z = z(eo) for some eo ∈ [e, e]} .
Proof of Proposition 2. According to equation (2):
C(E;α(·)) =
Z e
e
c(e;α(·))dF (e;E) = c(e;α(·)) +
Z e
e
∙
θ
Z e
e
α(z(x))dx
¸
dF (e;E).
Integrating by parts, we obtain:Z e
e
∙Z e
e
α(z(x))dx
¸
dF (e;E) =
∙∙Z e
e
α(z(x))dx
¸
F (e;E)
¸e=e
e=e
−
Z e
e
α(z(e))F (e;E)de
=
Z e
e
α(z(x))dx−
Z e
e
α(z(e))F (e;E)de.
Equation (3) immediately follows.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a solution β∗(·) to program [P 0] and B∗ the
optimal budget. We claim that β∗(·) is also the solution to the program [P 00] below:
Max
(β(e))e∈[e,e]
Z e
e
β(e)
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de
s.t.: β(e) is nonincreasing in e
β(e) ∈ [0, t/θ] for all e ∈ [e, e]Z e
e
β(e)dF (e;EC) ≤ B∗.
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Indeed, if a function β0(·) would exist involving a higher value for the solution, β∗(·)
would not be the solution to [P 0]: the EA could use β00(·) that coincides with β0(·) until
the lowest emissions level eo that satisfies
∆ = θ
Z eo
e
β0(e)
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de
and β00(e) = 0 for all e > eo. This policy would be cheaper than β0(·), hence it would cost
less than B∗, which is not possible.
We can now use known results (see, for example, Step 4 in the proof of Proposition 1
in Sánchez and Sobel, 1991) to state that there exists a solution to [P 00] that takes on at
most one value diﬀerent from 0 and t/θ.
Proof of Proposition 4. According to Proposition 3, we can rewrite [P 0] as [P 00] :
Min
(γ,e1,e2)
½
t
θ
F
¡
e1;EC
¢
+ γ
£
F
¡
e2;EC
¢
− F
¡
e1;EC
¢¤¾
s.t.:
∆
θ
=
t
θ
Z e1
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de+ γ
Z e2
e1
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de. (8)
We start by proving some claims.
Claim 1 : We can restrict attention to policies where e2 < e.
To prove Claim 1, consider the set of policies characterized by (e1, e2, γ), with e1 < e.
We do the analysis fixing the level of e1. The parameter γ is given by (8), that is,
γ =
1R e2
e1
[F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)] de
∙
∆
θ
− t
θ
Z e1
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de
¸
.
Therefore, the cost of the policy as a function of e2 is given by the function m(e2):
m(e2) ≡
t
θ
F (e1;EC) +A
F (e2;EC)− F (e1;EC)R e2
e1
[F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)] de ,
where A is a positive constant that does not depend on e2 (it is the second factor in the
expression for γ). m0(e2 = e) is proportional to f(e2;EC)
R e2
e1
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de.
Hence, m0(e2 = e) > 0 given Assumption 2. This implies that, at the optimum, it is
always the case that the cost is minimized for a value of e2 lower than e.
Claim 2 : A policy such that e1 = e2 < e∗ is not optimal.
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We consider the policies of the form β(e) = γ for all e ∈ [e, e) and β(e) = 0 for all
e ∈ [e, e], for which (8) holds. In this class of policies, we consider a marginal change ine, accompanied by the corresponding change in γ so that (8) still holds, i.e.,
∂γ
∂e = − γ
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)¤R he
e [F (e;E
C)− F (e;ED)] de
.
The cost of any policy in this class is γF (e;EC). Hence, the change in cost due to the
proposed marginal change is F (e;EC)∂γ + γf(e;EC)∂e = h(e)γ∂e. By Assumption 2,
h(e) < 0 given that e < e∗. Therefore, a marginal increase in e would reduce the cost.
Therefore, a policy with γ = t/θ (i.e., e1 = e2) cannot be optimal since there is room to
increase e and decrease γ in a profitable way, which proves Claim 2.
Claim 3 : A policy such that e1 < e2 is not optimal when e1 < e∗.
We follow a similar path as in Claim 2. Consider the class of policies of the form
β(e) = γ0 for all e ∈ [e, e1) , β(e) = γ for all e ∈ [e1, e2), and β(e) = 0 for all e ∈ [e2, e],
with γ0 > γ, for which equation (8) holds (where we substitute t/θ by γ0). We want to
show that γ0 = t/θ cannot be optimal within this class of policies (hence, it cannot be
optimal in general). A marginal change in e1 accompanied by the corresponding change
in γ0 so that equation (8) holds, must satisfy:
∂γ0
∂e1
= −
(γ0 − γ)
£
F (e1;EC)− F (e1;ED)
¤R e1
e [F (e;E
C)− F (e;ED)] de .
Given that the cost of the policy is γ0F
¡
e1;EC
¢
+ γ
£
F
¡
e2;EC
¢
− F
¡
e1;EC
¢¤
,the pro-
posed marginal change in e1 will result in a change in costs of h(e1) (γ0 − γ) ∂e1.
By the same reasons as in Claim 2, a marginal increase in e1 would decrease the costs
whenever e1 < e∗ and γ0 > γ. In particular, the policy where γ0 = t/θ cannot be optimal,
since there is room to decrease γ0 and increase e1, which lowers the cost of the monitoring.
Claim 4 : A policy such that e1 = e2 > e∗ and γ < t/θ is not optimal.
The proof is the same as the proof of Claim 2. The diﬀerence is that now h(e) is positive
since e> e∗ Therefore, decreasing e and increasing γ (when this change is possible, i.e.,
when γ < t/θ) decreases the costs of the policy.
Claim 5 : A policy such that e1 < e2 is not optimal when e1 ≥ e∗.
To prove this Claim, we consider Program [P 00] stated at the beginning of the proof of
Proposition 3. By contradiction, suppose that the optimal e1 is an interior solution (we
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already now that e2 < e). Denoting λ ≥ 0 the Lagrange multiplier of (8) in [P 00], the first
order conditions of the Lagrange function with respect to e1 and e2 must hold:
∂L
∂e1
=
∙
t
θ
− γ
¸ £
f
¡
e1;EC
¢
− λ
£
F (e1;EC)− F (e1;ED)
¤¤
= 0, (9)
∂L
∂e2
= γ
£
f
¡
e2;EC
¢
− λ
£
F (e2;EC)− F (e2;ED)
¤¤
= 0. (10)
Given γ > 0 and γ < t/θ, from (9) and (10), it follows that:
f
¡
e1;EC
¢
F (e1;EC)− F (e1;ED)
=
f
¡
e2;EC
¢
F (e2;EC)− F (e2;ED)
. (11)
Under Assumption 2, equation (11) is written as:
a+ 2 [1− a] e1
[a− b] [e1 − e21]
=
a+ 2 [1− a] e2
[a− b] [e2 − e22]
,
i.e., [a+ 2 [1− a] e1] e22− [a+ 2 [1− a] e21] e2+a [e1 − e21] = 0. Easy calculations show that,
when e1 ≥ e∗ the previous equality does not have any solution (in e2) in the interval
(e1, 1].
We now complete the proof of the proposition. Claims 3 and 5 allow to state that the
optimal policy has only two regions. Hence, it has the following form: β(e) = bγ for all
e ∈ [e, be) and β(e) = 0 for all e ∈ [be, e] , where, given Claims 1 and 2, be ∈ [e∗, e). Finally,
Claim 4 leaves as the unique candidate the policy proposed in Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5. (a) We first prove that, given α∗(z), z(e) is the optimal
firms’ strategy. It is easy to check that bγ < t/θ implies that firms either will report z = e
or z = z∗, any other possible report is dominated. The expected costs of a firm with
emissions level e are lower reporting e than z∗ if:
te+ bγθ [e− e] < tz∗ = te+ ∆ (e∗ − e)R e∗
e [F (e;E
C)− F (e;ED)] de
,
i.e., given the characterization of bγ,
∆ [e− e]R e∗
e [F (e;E
C)− F (e;ED)] de
<
∆ (e∗ − e)R e∗
e [F (e;E
C)− F (e;ED)] de
,
or e < e∗.
Since z(e) is optimal for the firms given α∗(z), the policy α∗(z) achieves the policy
β(e) found in Proposition 4, hence, it is optimal under Assumptions 1 and 2.
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(b) In this case, it is immediate to check that firms’ strategy is optimal given α∗(z)
and that the policy α∗(z) is then optimal.
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof follows easily from Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6. Given ∆n, the EA solves the following program:
Min
(β(e))e∈[e,e]
B
s.t.: β(e) is nonincreasing in e
β(e) ∈ [0, t/θ] for all e ∈ [e, e]
G(∆n)
Z e
e
β(e)dF (e;EC) + [1−G(∆n)]
Z e
e
β(e)dF (e;ED) ≤ B
∆n = θ
Z e
e
β(e)
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de.
Following the same steps as in Proposition 4, there exists a solution to the previous
program that takes on at most one value γ diﬀerent from 0 and t/θ. Also, the policy
minimizing monitoring costs must solve program [PM ] below:
Min
(γ,e1,e2)
½
t
θ
F
¡
e1;EM
¢
+ γ
£
F
¡
e2;EM
¢
− F
¡
e1;EM
¢¤¾
s.t.:
∆n
θ
=
t
θ
Z e1
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de+ γ
Z e2
e1
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de. (12)
where we have denoted F (e;EM) ≡ G(∆n)F (e;EC) + [1−G(∆n)]F (e;ED). We note
that the distribution function F (e;EM) is the cumulative distribution function of a linear
density function f(e;EM) = an + 2 [1− an] e, where an = G(∆n)a + [1−G(∆n)] b. We
denote
hn(e) ≡ f(e;EM)− F (e;E
C)− F (e;ED)R e
e [F (x;E
C)− F (x;ED)] dxF (e;E
M).
Under Assumption 2, hn(e) is first negative and then positive. We denote by en the cut-oﬀ
level such that hn(en) = 0.12 It is easily checked that en < e∗.
From now on, we can follow the same steps as in Claims 1 to 5 in the proof of
Proposition 4, where we have to consider ∆n instead of ∆, en instead of e∗, and hn()
instead of h(). The claims lead to the following unique candidate policy:
12More preciselly eo = −2a
o+
√
4ao2+6ao[1−ao]
2[1−ao] ∈ (0, 1) when ao 6= 1.
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(a) If ∆n < t
R en
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de, then :
βn(e) = bγn for all e ∈ [e, en) ,
βn(e) = 0 for all e ∈ [en, e] , with
bγnθ Z en
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de =n .
(b) If ∆n ≥ t
R en
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de, then:
βn(e) = t/θ for all e ∈ [e, ben) ,
βn(e) = 0 for all e ∈ [ben, e] , with
t
Z en
e
£
F (e;EC)− F (e;ED)
¤
de = ∆n.
Given the previous function βn(e), we follow the same steps as in the proof of Propo-
sition 5 to show that the function αn(z) corresponds to βn(e). The cut-oﬀ value zn
that appears in the Proposition corresponds to the report that makes a firm whose re-
alized emission is en indiﬀerent between reporting 0 (and being monitored with prob-
ability bγn) and reporting zn and avoiding monitoring. That is, zn is characterized by
te+ bγnθ [en − e] = tzn.
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